Behavior in the centipede game: A decision-theoretical perspective

The centipede game is a two-player finite game of perfect information where a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium appears to be intuitively unappealing and descriptively inadequate. This paper analyzes behavior in the centipede game when a traditional game-theoretical assumption that players maximize expected utility is relaxed. We demonstrate the existence of a descriptively adequate subgame perfect equilibrium under two standard decision-theoretical assumptions. First, players choose under uncertainty in a probabilistic manner as captured by embedding a core deterministic decision theory in a model of probabilistic choice. Second, players adopt non-linear decision weights and overweight the likelihood of rare events as captured, for example, by rank-dependent utility or prospect theory

Intertemporal choice with different short-term and long-term discount factors

This paper proposes a new axiomatic model of intertemporal choice that allows for dynamic inconsistency. We weaken the classical assumption of stationarity into two related axioms: stationarity in the short-term and stationarity in the long-term. We obtain a model with two independent discount factors, which is flexible enough to capture different time preferences, including a greater impatience for more immediate outcomes (when a long-term discount factor exceeds a compounded short-term discount factor). Our proposed model can accommodate some experimental results that cannot be rationalized by other existing models of dynamic inconsistency (such as quasi-hyperbolic discounting and generalized hyperbolic discounting)

Evidence for surprise minimization over value maximization in choice behavior

Classical economic models are predicated on the idea that the ultimate aim of choice is to maximize utility or reward. In contrast, an alternative perspective highlights the fact that adaptive behavior requires agents' to model their environment and minimize surprise about the states they frequent. We propose that choice behavior can be more accurately accounted for by surprise minimization compared to reward or utility maximization alone. Minimizing surprise makes a prediction at variance with expected utility models; namely, that in addition to attaining valuable states, agents attempt to maximize the entropy over outcomes and thus 'keep their options open'. We tested this prediction using a simple binary choice paradigm and show that human decision-making is better explained by surprise minimization compared to utility maximization. Furthermore, we replicated this entropy-seeking behavior in a control task with no explicit utilities. These findings highlight a limitation of purely economic motivations in explaining choice behavior and instead emphasize the importance of belief-based motivations

Violations of betweenness and choice shifts in groups

In decision theory, the betweenness axiom postulates that a decision maker who chooses an alternative A over another alternative B must also choose any probability mixture of A and B over B itself and can never choose a probability mixture of A and B over A itself. The betweenness axiom is a weaker version of the independence axiom of expected utility theory. Numerous empirical studies documented systematic violations of the betweenness axiom in revealed individual choice under uncertainty. This paper shows that these systematic violations can be linked to another behavioral regularity\u2014choice shifts in a group decision making. Choice shifts are observed if an individual faces the same decision problem but makes a different choice when deciding alone and in a group

Elicitation of Preferences under Ambiguity

This paper is about behaviour under ambiguity ‒ that is, a situation in which probabilities either do not exist or are not known. Our objective is to find the most empirically valid of the increasingly large number of theories attempting to explain such behaviour. We use experimentally-generated data to compare and contrast the theories. The incentivised experimental task we employed was that of allocation: in a series of problems we gave the subjects an amount of money and asked them to allocate the money over three accounts, the payoffs to them being contingent on a ‘state of the world’ with the occurrence of the states being ambiguous. We reproduced ambiguity in the laboratory using a Bingo Blower. We fitted the most popular and apparently empirically valid preference functionals [Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), MaxMin Expected Utility (MEU) and α­-MEU], as well as Mean-Variance (MV) and a heuristic rule, Safety First (SF). We found that SEU fits better than MV and SF and only slightly worse than MEU and α­-MEU

How do risk attitudes affect measured confidence?

We examine the relationship between confidence in own absolute performance and risk attitudes using two confidence elicitation procedures: self-reported (non-incentivised) confidence and an incentivised procedure that elicits the certainty equivalent of a bet based on performance. The former procedure reproduces the “hard-easy effect” (underconfidence in easy tasks and overconfidence in hard tasks) found in a large number of studies using non-incentivised self-reports. The latter procedure produces general underconfidence, which is significantly reduced, but not eliminated when we filter out the effects of risk attitudes. Finally, we find that self-reported confidence correlates significantly with features of individual risk attitudes including parameters of individual probability weighting

Joy leads to overconfidence, and a simple countermeasure

Overconfidence has been identified as a source of suboptimal decision making in many real-life domains, with often far-reaching consequences. This study identifies a mechanism that can cause overconfidence and demonstrates a simple, effective countermeasure in an incentive-compatible experimental study. We observed that joy induced overconfidence if the reason for joy (an unexpected gift) was u

Measuring Risk Attitudes Controlling for Personality Traits*

Abstract: This study measures risk attitudes using two paid experiments: the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure and a variation of the game show Deal or No Deal. The participants also completed a series of personality questionnaires developed in the psychology literature including the risk domains of Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002). As in previous studies risk attitudes vary within subjects across elicitation methods. However, this variation can be explained by individual personality traits. Specifically, subjects behave as though the Holt and Laury task is an investment decision while the Deal or No Deal task is a gambling decision